College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications

1999

If You Don't Have Anything Good to Say...
Peter A. Alces
William & Mary Law School, paalce@wm.edu

Repository Citation
Alces, Peter A., "If You Don't Have Anything Good to Say..." (1999). Faculty Publications. 282.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/282

Copyright c 1999 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs

Faculty and Deans

Book Reviews
FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS:
REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SYSTEM.

Karen Gross.* New Haven: Yale University Press.

1997. Pp. X, 250.
''IF YOU DON'T HAVE ANYTHING GOOD TO SAY .... "
Reviewed by
Peter A Alces**
Upon first reading Professor Gross's Failure and Forgiveness,
("Failure") 1 I was struck by its clarity, its candor, and its simplicity.
Rereading the book in preparation for this review confirmed that
the work is provocative, and focused my attention on five of the
author's conclusions:
1. Bankruptcy judges have very little time to spend on individual bankruptcy cases, and as case loads multiply, judges will
have less and less time to spend on individual cases.
2. There are debtors and there are debtors. The bankruptcy
world would work better, at least be more aesthetically
pleasing, if we distinguish "good" from "not so good" from
"bad debtors."

*
**

Karen Gross is a professor oflaw at New York Law School.
Professor of Law, The College of William and Mary.
1
KAREN GROSS, FAILURE AND FORGIVENESS: REBALANCING THE BANKRUPTCY SWTEM 7475 (1997)
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3. Creditors should expect no more from bankruptcy than
what they need.
4. Apparently unique from other areas of the law, bankruptcy
affects people beyond the immediate parties to the bankruptcy proceeding.
5. People are fundamentally altruistic.
I am convinced that these five points are central to Professor Gross's
thesis. And I am equally convinced that the book does no more to
advance the literature than throwing a pie in the face of Bill Gates
does to advance the Luddite cause.
Still, it was difficult shake the suspicion that there must be important points made by the book. There have to be important
points; after all the book is 250 pages long and took the author and
a very prestigious publisher several years to produce. Certainly so
much talent and effort could not have been expended on a project
that says absolutely nothing new and worthwhile.
I was wrong.
I shall elaborate on that conclusion in the four Parts that follow
by first responding to Professor Gross's observations regarding the
bankruptcy process, next considering her depiction of debtors, then
discerning the consequences of her proposals regarding creditors,
and finally coming to terms with the vacuity of her conception of
community.
I.

'WERETHEREBUTWORLDENOUGHANDTIME ... "

The strongest chapter of Failure is Chapter 5: 'What Is Transpiring in the Bankruptcy System?" Gross offers a cacophony of figures and statistics describing the bankruptcy system in terms that
might well support careful analysis of the status quo and worthwhile
recommendations for adjustment of current law. She tells us about
the number of filings, the rate of increase in the number of filings, 2
and types of bankruptcy protection that debtors seek. 3 She counts
creditors and takes account of the types of claims that they bring to

• See id. at 74, 76.
See id. at 83-85.

3
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the bankruptcy table. 4 And she notices the type of interests affected
by bankruptcy that the bankruptcy statistics do not notice.5
It is never really clear what point Gross is making by her recitation of bankruptcy statistics, and the conclusion of Chapter 5 offers
little guidance:
Owing to quantification problems, some commentators believe that
the welfare of communities, the continuity of existing businesses, and
the preservation of self-worth and human dignity should not be considered within the bankruptcy process. [No cite is offered in support
of that accusation.] But the inability to measure these interests easily
in dollars and cents does not mean that the interests lack value. Instead, what it demonstrates is that our existing economic model is too
narrow. If we limit our assessment of bankruptcy's impact to money,
we resort to a unidimensional perspective. Therefore, the felt costs of
business bankruptcy may not be measurable in strict, neoclassical
6
economic models.

It could be, of course, that those who consider numbers, dollars and
cents, believe that the values Gross would champion are not measurable and that these values are neither vindicated nor frustrated by
the bankruptcy law. That is, people engage in economic activity to
achieve economic goals, and one economic result is no more certain than another to further or frustrate self-worth and human dignity. For instance, family farming may be charming, and family
farmers may choose to make economic sacrifices to enjoy that
unique charm; but if we ask others to subsidize that lifestyle (by
forcing investment of economic rather than psychic assets to the
preservation of the farm) we may well be compromising someone
else's dream.' Bankruptcy cannot answer every question; it cannot
make all dreams come true. It can endeavor to minimize some of

' See id. at 79-81.
' See id. at 81-83, 88.
• Id. at88.
7
Consider:
Though the irrationality and absurdity of modem agricultural policy is perhaps
most easily seen in the United States, we must tum to other countries if we are to
become aware of the full extent to which such policies, systematically pursued, are
liable to impose restrictions on the farmer (whose "sturdy independence" is at the
same time often referred to as an argument for maintaining him at public expense) and tum him into the most regimented and supervised of all producers.
FREDERICKA. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OFLIBERT¥362-63 (1960).
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the economic and financial disruption caused by outrageous fortune or improvident choices.
Gross's perspective demands more of bankruptcy and it is difficult to see why she would limit the scope of her agenda to the bankruptcy system. Certainly she seems unconcerned with the scarceness of resources, though she notes that
At a 95% level of statistical reliability, business Chapter 7 cases occupied 40 minutes per case of judicial time, whereas nonbusiness Chapter 7 cases occupied 10 minutes of time per case. On average, judges
spent 38 minutes on each Chapter 13 case. Judges spent on average
456 minutes [seven and one-half hours] on each Chapter 11 case,
8
with the amount of time increasing with the size of the case.

So whatever Professor Gross has in mind for the bankruptcy system,
she will have to work her proposals into those time constraints or
fmd a way to attract more judicial resources, as well as the means to
pay for them, without sacrificing anything that she might find
worthwhile in the current system.
But it is not even at all clear that Gross really understands the
very figures she recites. After offering the foregoing delineation of
judicial time spent on different types of bankruptcy cases, she identifies what she apparently perceives to be an anomaly: "In simple
terms, the greatest amount of judicial time is spent on cases that
constitute the smallest percentage of filed cases-the mega chapter
II cases. "9 She seems to ignore the fact that those mega chapter II
cases may well have the greatest effect on the community interests
that she would champion. That is, the statistics she uses to demonstrate judicial inattention to the interests of individuals may establish, were she to look a bit further, that courts do spend the most
time on the cases that directly and indirectly affect the most people.
Notwithstanding her curious catalog and reading of the statistics she amassed, Gross's arithmetic conclusion regarding the
amount of time judges can spend on cases is helpful. It provides the
frame of reference to consider her conclusions about bankruptcy
debtors, creditors, and the impact that bankruptcy has on community.

8
9

GROSS, supra note 1, at 132.
Id.
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II. DEBTOR EQUITY
Despite what the Bible says about stealing, a Church of England priest
suggested today it is no sin to shoplift-as long as the victim is a big
supermarket. . . . [The cleric] drew a distinction between stealing
from individuals or small merchants-which he said is wrong-and
stealing from giant retailing corporations. Those, he said, have run
little stores out of business and harmed local communities.... The
Church of England distanced itself from [the cleric], and others
. . d. 10
JOine
m.

Professor Gross places debtors on a culpability scale and then
describes how debtor culpability might inform the sum and substance of the bankruptcy law. Her conclusion is that debtors need
forgiveness; in fact, forgiveness is "[T]he solution to the problem of
nonpaying debtors." 11 I am in favor of forgiveness. I seek it often
and am also pleased to find it; occasionally I forgive. (I've even been
known to forget.) But Professor Gross fails to come to terms with
the incentives for strategic behavior that her focus on forgiveness
invites, and she paints the points on her culpability scale in the simplistic primary colors that ignore the shades of grey that more accurately would capture real debtors and their debts. Sure it would be
great if we could all forgive and be forgiven without any undesirable
consequences. But life, and certainly bankruptcy life, is too often a
zero sum game and forgiveness comes at a cost. Further, even were
we sure that forgiveness is the answer, Gross acknowledges that forgiveness must be deserved. How are we to determine who is deserving and at what cost? Gross posits a myopic continuum:
Suppose that each of five farmers borrowed money from the
bank to buy seed for the next crop. The farmers and the bank anticipated that the crop revenues would be sufficient to service this
short-term borrowing. Come time to repay, however, none of the five
farmers had sufficient funds. The reasons why they could not repay
are very different.
First Farmer planted his seed, but his fields were hit by a plague
of locusts, destroying the crop. The money to repay the bank never

10

English Priest Stirs Up A Storm Byjustifying Some Shoplifting, WASH. Posr,
Mar. 16, 1997, atA28.
n GROSS, supra note 1, at 93.
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materialized. Second Farmer also planted his seed. As it was growing, he decided to purchase a new machine that was supposed to
make harvesting less expensive by decreasing the amount of necessary labor. Unfortunately, the machine did not function faster than
manual harvesting, as Second Farmer had hoped. Had Second
Farmer thoroughly investigated the machine, he would have learned
that it had not been fully tested. Because the machine failed, Second
Farmer's crop was delayed getting to market, and the crop yielded
less revenue than he needed to repay his debt. Third Farmer
planted, harvested, and sold his crop. Rather than repay the bank,
however, he used the money to repay some of his other creditors,
who were hounding him. Fourth Farmer planted his seed and harvested his crop, and he had sufficient revenues. But on the way to
the bank, he bumped into a group of old friends, and they sat down
together to play some cards. Fourth Farmer lost all his money. Finally, Fifth Farmer, unlike the other farmers, never purchased the
seed. Instead, he took the proceeds of the bank loan and used them
to purchase a new luxury automobile and take a cruise to the Baha12
mas. In the end, he, too, had no money to repay the bank.

Professor Gross follows that hypothetical with her own conclusions
regarding the culpability of each of the farmers and the impact of
their relative culpability on their claims to forgiveness. 13 The First
Farmer is least culpable (most deserving of forgiveness, "discharge"
in bankruptcy parlance) and the Fifth Farmer the most culpable,
least deserving. She would forgive more readily the less blameworthy and thereby create incentives for people to be less blameworthy.
Of course, Professor Gross's hypotheticals are so simplistic as to
be essentially useless given her aspirations for the bankruptcy system. The venal do not always appear so obviously so and the difference between the well meaning but ignorant and the careless is not
always so easily discerned. It would not be responsive for her to argue that the hypotheticals are only designed to describe in summary
terms the nature of her forgiveness calculus. Facts are hard (and
expensive) to find, and her construction depends on the reliable
determination of facts. Further, her framework assumes that all
people will respond to forgiveness the same way ("people are inherently decent,"14 whatever that might mean), that blameless third
" Id. at 105-06.
" See id. at 106-08.
" Id. at. 109.
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parties will not be affected by a decision not to forgive the debtor. 15
In Professor Gross's world of forgiveness, would we really want to
punish, refuse to forgive Fifth Farmer, if he is the sole source of
support for an invalid child who is unable to care for herself?; could
we ignore the fact that First Farmer has a criminal record and a history of embezzlement and does not have any dependents that rely
on him?
In the real bankruptcy world we choose to ignore a good deal
that would complicate a forgiveness calculus. But do we ignore
complicating facts because we are not concerned with social reality?
No. We ignore them in bankruptcy because there is only so much
we can do in bankruptcy. We cannot determine who is deserving of
forgiveness. It is ludicrous, presumptuous, and even arrogant to believe that we could. That is not to say that the world would not be a
more beautiful place if only the deserving were forgiven, and forgiven in the right measure. Bankruptcy, though, has no business
trying to do what our philosophical, theological, and general normative inquiries have failed to do. Gross is more confident of her
philosophical and psychological acumen than I can be about anyone's wisdom. 16
In the Code's bar to discharge provisions, bankruptcy already
takes into account some of the culpability indicia that Gross would
utilize. 17 Granted, the Code does the cutting with a hatchet rather
than a scalpel. But, if anything, the bankruptcy law should do less
rather than more to further social policies unrelated to economic
distress. The Code already looks too much like the Internal Revenue Code. I would argue that the Bankruptcy Code should not try
to be the social engineering catastrophe that the IRC has become.
Perhaps we need a normatively flat Code as some would argue that
we need a flat tax. And that is not because it would be undesirable
to have bankruptcy do some equity. That is because the cost of its
doing equity, and probably doing it badly in the knee jerk way Gross
contemplates, would be both prohibitively expensive and ultimately
foolish.

" Professor Gross does make the point that "some debtors cannot be rehabilitated so
they should not be forgiven." Id. at 104. We can imagine that loan applications would need
to include a line on which the borrower describes her capacity for rehabilitation.
•• Id. at 108-11.
" See 11 U.S.C. §§ 523 & 727 (1994).
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Bankruptcy law, like all law, is to an extent about finding out
what we can afford to find out. Professor Gross has no sense of the
limits of the possible, and reflects that nonsense in the very same
text in which she reproduces figures describing the very few minutes
that bankruptcy judges have to spend on cases. 18 Further, why
would we want (largely affluent and insulated) bankruptcy judges to
make normative judgments they have no particular training or expertise to make, even if there were enough time and resources?
Another phase of the same type of fundamental error emerges
when Professor Gross takes on corporate law by attacking the limited liability system. The normative vacuity of limited liability is not
much of a discovery. It does not take much moral sense to realize
that those who do not have to answer for their failures will fail more
often. Ifyou can use someone else's money, you will gamble more
and be less risk averse. That circumstance is only exacerbated when
you can gamble with someone else's money, keep the winnings for
yourself, and leave the losses on your benefactor. The attack on the
limited liability doctrine can be made, but must be made in a
thoughtful, deliberate manner. The legal literature is not much advanced by attacking the excesses of the doctrine without taking into
account the economic consequences of doing so.
Failure concludes that limited liability makes good sense in
many nonbankruptcy contexts. But it produces a wide range of
anomalous results within the bankruptcy system that lead to concern over whether it should be fully retained in that context. Because limited liability is clearly a matter of state law, one must ask
whether federal law (that is, bankruptcy) should take precedence
over state law, thereby curtailing limited liability for corporate officers, directors, and shareholders. 19
Of course it is in bankruptcy that limited liability most matters.
It is striking that a law professor could conclude that limited liability
should be abrogated in the case where the officers, directors, and
shareholders would most want to rely on their liability's being limited-when the firm fails-and not take into account, not even try
to imagine, the consequences of abrogating limited liability in that
setting. To abrogate limited liability in bankruptcy, where it arguably matters most, is essentially to abrogate limited liability alto-

18

See GROSS, supra note 1, at 132.
•• Id. at 126.
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gether. If Professor Gross wants to make that argument, she must at
least consider the case that can be made for limited liability. It is
simply not responsible to ignore the incentives that her proposal
would create and the consequences of her proposal in economic
terms.
The commentator's "analysis" is not sophisticated. While she
acknowledges that "[t]his approach [abrogation of limited liability]
has its downsides" and the "[i]ndividuals could be deterred from
serving as officers or directors of corporate entities[,]" she rejoins
that "individuals now continue to serve despite fiduciary tax liability
or even environmental claims."20 Is she really unable to appreciate
the difference between fiduciary tax and environmental liability and
the potential liability for all tort and contract claims assertable
against a corporate debtor? Does it make any sense to posit personal liability of corporate shareholders without considering the nature of shareholder involvement? Should I be personally liable for
the contract and tort liability of every company whose stock is held
by a mutual fund in which I invest?

III. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR CREDITORS OR HOW TO MAKE BIG
CREDITORS SMALL CREDITORS

GEORGE BAILEY: You're thinking of this place all wrong, as if I've
got the money back in a safe. The money's not here. Well your
money's in Joe's house; that's right next to yours and the Kennedy
house and a hundred others. You're lending them the money to
build and then they are going to pay you back as best they can. Now
what are you going to do? Foreclose on them?
TOM: I've got $242 in here and $242 isn't going to break anybody.
MARY [waving a wad of cash ... ]: How much do you need?!
GEORGE: I've got $2000. Here's $2000. That will tide us over until
the bank reopens. Alright.
TOM: how much do you need?
TOM:$242.
GEORGE: Ah Tom, just enough to tide you over 'til the bank reopens.
TOM: I'll take $242.
GEORGE: There you are.

"' Id. at 127.
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MAN: I've got $300, George.
GEORGE: What'll it take 'til the bank opens?
MAN: Well, I suppose $20.
GEORGE: $20. Now you're talkin'. Now, Mrs. Compton, how much
do you want?
MRS. COMPTON: But it's your money, George.
GEORGE: Never mind about that. Now, how much do you want?
MRS. COMPTON: I can get along with $20. Alright.
GEORGE: $20, fine.
MRS. COMPTON: And I'll sign a paper.
GEORGE: You don't need to sign anything. I know, you pay it when
you can. Hi Miss Davis.
MISS DAVIS: Can I have $17.50?
21
GEORGE: Bless your heart. Of course you can have it.

Professor Gross begins her discussion of the treatment of creditors in bankruptcy by distinguishing equality of treatment from
equality of outcome, and she pursues the distinction for many more
pages than are necessary to make the point that a loss of $5000 to
me is more significant, in some way, than would be the loss of $5000
to Microsoft. So if we both lose that amount, we have been treated
equally but have experienced unequal outcomes. 22 On that certainly
accurate premise, Gross rests her conclusion that bankruptcy should
take into account the impact bankruptcy will have on a particular
creditor (though not those dependent on the creditor?) in deciding
how much a creditor should realize from the bankruptcy proceeding. This leads her to champion the cause of "small" creditors over
that of larger creditors.
To some extent the distinction that she draws is already vindicated in the priority provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, 23 but once
again Gross would go further in her quest for equality than does the
current law:
Under [her proposal], any unsecured creditor, large or small in either size of entity or amount owed, could challenge the standard pro
rata distribution as it applied to him or her. The distribution system
would continue to operate based on equality of treatment (subject to

"
22

23

IT'S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films 1946).
See GROSS, supra note 1, at 13844.
See 11 U.S.C. § 507 (1994).
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the more elaborate understanding of equal treatment with separate
classification and payouts), but a creditor could rebut the presumption of equal treatment upon a showing of irreparable iJ:Uury. A rebuttal would then enable the creditor to recover based on equality of
24
outcome rather than equality of treatment.

Irreparably injured creditors would receive a priority. Professor Gross offers examples of sufficiently irreparable injury:
"imminent collapse of a business, mortgage foreclosure on the
creditor's home, or inability to acquire needed medical care."25 She
again offers a sliding scale of irreparable injury26 and reaches conclusions about the creditors' relative worthiness. 27 That "analysis" is
no more convincing than it was when Gross compared debtors' relative forgiveness-worthiness. There is no reason to re-engage her on
essentially the same front.
More interesting is Professor Gross's consideration of the way
that her scheme would have an impact on transactors' strategic behavior.
At first glance, it seems that creditors as a whole would be disinclined
to adopt this suggested approach, particularly as one or more creditors could obtain greater distribution than others and receive it ear-

" GROSS, supra note I, at 165.
" Id.
,. Suppose four creditors each lent Smythe one thousand dollars. They all seek to
rebut the presumption. First Creditor, a good friend, wants to be repaid so she can
buy luxury goods for herself. Had she not lent Smythe the money (or had she
been repaid), she would have been able to make such purchases, having saved and
invested prudently. Second Creditor is Smythe's next door neighbor. Since the
loan, her spouse has become very ill, and without obtaining repayment or taking
out a home equity loan, she cannot put food on the table. Third Creditor is
Smythe's co-worker. A profligate spender, he needs to be repaid so he can pay his
own rent because he has no savings. Fourth Creditor is a finance company that had
mailed Smythe a credit application, which it subsequently approved without much
investigation.
Id. at 165-66.
" Distinguishing among these creditors is hard and can be done only through a
subjective assessment. With that caveat, an argument can be proffered that only
Second Creditor and Third Creditor will suffer irreparable harm if they are not repaid. Although one may not feel badly [sic] for Fourth Creditor, First Creditor
evokes sympathy-but not enough to rebut the presumption.
Id. at 166 (emphasis added). (Perhaps I date myself, and reveal something embarrassing
about my early television viewing habits, but does that type of pathos meter sound a little bit
like "Queen for a Day"?).
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lier to boot. But creditors could be convinced of the merits of the system. First, some creditors are willing to look beyond their own selfinterest. Moreover, creditors may appreciate the concept of the rebuttable presumption because it would be available to them if they
needed it prospectively. Additionally, if creditors were aware of the
possibility that a limited pool of creditors would receive preferential
treatment, they could factor this into the initial assessment of
28
whether to do business with the debtor and at what price.

Her statement is ludicrous. Put aside the fact that there are real disincentives for investing in businesses that "look beyond their own
self-interest" in the amorphous sense that Gross seems to have in
mind and concentrate on her observation that creditors would price
the financial extremis of their debtors' other creditors into the
prices they charge those debtors. Would there be a question on
loan applications such as: "List all of your current and potential future creditors and offer an assessment of the impact of your financial failure on their financial condition. Attach a separate sheet if
necessary"? It is impossible to imagine the deleterious effects that
Gross's proposal would have on the cost of credit. This proposal,
just like the discharge proposal, would introduce fatal uncertainty
into the economy, complicating if not confounding any pricing
mechanism, and destroying the fundamental assumptions that support our fmancial system. Perhaps I exaggerate, but not much.
The reductio ad absurdum of Professor Gross's rebuttable presumption proposal is captured in her conclusion that
Large creditors, unlike many small ones, do have the capacity to recoup losses by passing them onto others [employees, consumers, and
small creditors?] and withstanding the lag time between the loss and
the recoupment. And unlike many small community-based businesses, large businesses can decide not to extend unsecured credit in
large amounts. Because large creditors have these options, it is easier
to foist more burdens on them, reallocating loss from unstable busi29
ness to more stable ones [and making the stable ones unstable too?]

This conclusion rises to the level of irresponsible scholarship because Gross fails to thoughtfully work through the ramifications of
her scheme. Frankly, it would be more coherent, but no more re" Id.at 167.
,. Id. at 175.
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sponsible, for her to argue that the United States Treasury should
simply print whatever amount of money is necessary to avoid anything less than one hundred cents on the dollar payoffs in bankruptcy. In fact, it might well be that the deleterious impact of that
suggestion would be less extreme than the consequences of the argument in Gross's Failure.
As in the Debtors section of her book, Professor Gross does not
advance the literature in the Creditors section. The world she imagines has no "reality referent" and her efforts to posit facts that would
accommodate her analysis are incomplete and fundamentally
flawed. She takes into account some of the incentives to which her
proposals would give rise but describes their operation incompletely, ignoring cost and simply imagining that, somehow, her
proposal would create wealth. In fact, it is probably more likely that
her adjustment of the bankruptcy law would destroy wealth and reduce welfare (at the expense of society's most destitute) by undermining certainty in commercial transactions and increasing fact
finding costs exponentially.
IV. COMMUNITY: WHAT A WONDERFUL DAY IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD
One cannot be a propagandist in the service of truth or an advocate
in the service of justice, for the character and the motives are wrong.
And character and motive are for these purposes everything, for
'truth' and 'justice' are not abstract absolutes, to be attained or not in
materially measurable ways; these are words that define shared motives out of which a community and a culture can be built and a character made for the individual and his world. They express an atti30
tude, imply a process, and promise a community.
"Mercy to a criminal may be gross injustice to the community. ,3t

Professor Gross's arguments concerning the validation of
community interests in bankruptcy is the crescendo toward which
the first nearly two hundred pages of her book builds. At the outset
of Part IV she asks the question: ''What is meant by community?"32
"' JAMES BOYD WHITE, A Dialogue on Ethics, HERACLES' Bow: EssA)S ON THE RHETORIC
ANDPOETICSOFTHEI..AW221 (1985).
u Scott Wav~ xxxii (1814). OXFORD ENGUSH DICTIONARY, Vol. ill, p. 582.
" GROSS, supra note I, at 193.
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And, best as I can tell, she never provides a worthwhile definition of
the term. It would seem to me that community is what we mean by
the sum total of pooled individual interests. There is no alchemy by
which the whole is somehow normatively greater than the sum of its
parts. Indeed, in some responsible philosophies, the individual may
be more important than the community, in significant ways. There
is a distributive power generated by interdependent individuals;
conscientious pursuit of self-interest, broadly (and correctly) defined may well do more to assure the greater welfare than any more
awkward and intrusive efforts at social engineering in the name of
"community."
But Professor Gross ignores Adam Smith's invisible hand and
waxes poetic about terms that she never stops to define. In arguing
for small town squares over less personal shopping malls she observes that "[a]lthough pleasantness of surroundings is not commonly factored into the traditional neoclassical economic model,
the long-term consequences of human unhappiness with a place are
not insignificant. "33 I have no idea what support could possibly be
offered for the assertion that the neoclassical economic model takes
no account of "pleasantness of surroundings." People go to malls,
spend money in malls, and earn money in malls because such places
are pleasant, more pleasant, at least in an economic sense because
they are more convenient, than the alternative village squares. If
that were not so, the malls would be ghost towns and every suburb
would have a vibrant downtown. Economics can explain why people go to malls, why people (in the aggregate) prefer malls to downtown storefronts, but economics does not rely on indeterminate
conceptions such as "pleasantness" to explain why people shop at
malls. That does not mean that economics takes no account of
pleasantness. Economics merely uses less subjective and more comprehensible terminology than words such as "pleasant."
To support her conclusion that people care about community
for the sake of community (and not as the sum of their individual
interests), Gross posits the foundation of her philosophy: "[A] t their
core, people are altruistic and are willing to forgo certain selfinterests to accomplish larger goals."34 She anticipates the reflex response to her bald and obviously unsupportable conclusion:

"
"

Id. at 199.
Id. at200.
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[u]ltimately, I am no more able to prove that people are inherently
good than detractors will be able to prove that people are inherently
bad. All I can hope to demonstrate is that the picture is not as bleak
35
as some imagine it to be.

First, it is not at all clear what it would mean to say that people
are "all good." All people are likely a combination of things that
some people would consider good and other people would consider
not so good or even bad. Second, the "detractors" Gross refers to
would likely not say that people are all bad just because people act
in their own self interest. That is not bad; it is just human. Third, if
by "bad" Gross does mean selfish, then her "detractors" would be
able to prove that they are more right than Gross by pointing to the
great predictive value of microeconomics, which is based on the assumption that people act in their own self-interest.
It would be tempting to beat that horse further, but ultimately
the exercise would generate more heat than light. It is probably
more worthwhile to tum to a consideration of Professor Gross's
specific proposal for explicitly including community interest into
the bankruptcy calculus. She would adjust the chapter 11 Reorganization law to provide that "[t]he court shall confirm a plan if ...
[t]he plan takes the interests of community into account unless the
balance of equities clearly favors denial of these interests." She
would define "community" as "those persons, including the government, with a nexus with the debtor for whom (1) there is substantial injury caused by the bankruptcy filing and (2) that injury is
redressable through the reorganization process. "36 That proposal
seems vacuous to me, and I do not mean merely that it is inefficacious or would do little or no good. I mean that it would do incalculable harm because it would require a bankruptcy court to engage
in an exercise akin to calculating the number of angels that can
dance on the head of a pin. Why not just enjoin the bankruptcy
court to "do the right thing, all things considered."
I have no doubt that Professor Gross believes that she could
make such a calculation, and with great certainty. She demonstrates
no reticence about coming to terms, in chauvinistic fashion, with
life's fundamental mysteries in ways that she deems supportive of
her communitarian view. For example, she states that: "people who
" Id.
"' Id. at 228-29.
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are married experience a different kind of commitment from those
who are unmarried."37 That assertion is probably preposterous and
certainly useless and does not deserve to be taken seriously on its
own merits, much less as an argument in favor of taking community
interest into account. Gross's brand of pseudo-science, psychology,
and philosophy is the foundation of Failure.

V.

CONCLUSION

In her preface to the soft-cover edition of Failure, Professor
Gross notes that in the bankruptcy debate, the running dialogue
about the essential values that a bankruptcy system should vindicate,
lines have been drawn and even ad hominem attacks have begun to
surface. If she is right about the tenor of the debate, and I have no
reason to question her observations in that regard, that is unfortunate. The tone of this review has been derisive and I acknowledge
that. But my attack is on Failure, not on Karen Gross. She is a fine
person, who, from what I can tell, takes her job seriously and does
the best she can to contribute to the literature. My conclusion that
Failure is a failure is not a conclusion that Professor Gross cannot
make important contributions as a teacher and commentator on the
bankruptcy law. I have seen her make fine presentations that reveal
a keen sense of the Supreme Court's bankruptcy jurisprudence.
I am troubled by the fact that Failure does not seem to me to
be responsible scholarship. The commercial law (including the
bankruptcy law) is too often belittled in favor of more "prestigious"
legal subjects. That is unfortunate. A book about bankruptcy, published by the Yale University Press, that endeavors to be accessible to
lay people should be thoughtful, should anticipate the difficult
questions that engaged readers would ask, and should offer responses. Failure does not do any of that, in any but the most superficial terms. The book falls back on words that have emotional currency, "altruism," for instance, but which the law cannot afford to
treat in the superficial, facile manner of day time talk shows.
I must make clear, however, that I am not troubled by Professor
Gross's aspirations for the bankruptcy law (and the world, for that
matter). I agree it would be wonderful if every debtor received his
just desserts and were perfectly happy with that. In fact, were that
possible, I can see no reason for limiting that result to the bank"' Id.at230.
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ruptcy courts. In a way, Professor Gross is not ambitious enough,
why not extend her argument to all dispute resolution fora?
Wouldn't the world be a better place if we could always, in every legal setting, irrespective of the financial extremis of one of the parties, distribute resources in the most "fair" way? In a world of perfect justice, those of us who do not know what is just would be
enlightened and there would be no waste. VCRs would even be easy
to program and no one would ever need exact change.
That goal, perfect justice, is not realizable because we could
never reach consensus on what perfect justice is any more than we
could agree on what "community" or "culpability" means. Professor
Gross's book fails because she ignores the limits of the possible. We
do not all live in Bedford Falls; but we do not live in Potterville either. We live where we live and we can afford to do what we can afford to do. A book that recognizes the limits of the possible would
be much more worthwhile than a road map of George Bailey's
hometown.
We have the right to expect more serious scholarship than
Failure delivers, and that is the pity. The work has received much
more attention than it deserves; we should move on.
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